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Where did anthropology Go? 
 
[published in Maurice Bloch, “essays on cultural transmission”] 
 
The question: “Where did anthropology go?” was recently asked of me by a 
psycho-linguist from a famous American university.  She was commenting on 
the fact that she had tried to establish contact with the anthropology 
department of her institution, hoping that she would find somebody who 
would contribute to a discussion of her main research interest: the relation of 
words to concepts.  She had assumed that the socio- cultural anthropologists 
would have general theories about the way being brought up in different 
cultures and different environments would constrain or not constrain the way 
children were able to represent the material and the social world. She was 
hoping for information about exotic societies and about those groups, which 
she had already learned, should not be called primitive, but that is what she 
meant. She was hoping that her enquiry about a topic which is inevitable in 
any discussion about culture would be one which would be equally central to 
the three disciplines of psychology, linguistics and anthropology, and which 
would therefore be an ideal ground for constructive co-operation; that is one 
where the different parties could articulate and challenge the theories on which 
their different disciplines were built. 
 
 In fact she found nobody who was interested in working with her, but what 
surprised her most was the hostility she perceived, caused, not only by the 
suggestion that cultural social anthropologists were interested in simple exotic 
societies, but even more by the idea that they might be interested in 
formulating and answering general questions about the nature of the human 
species or that their work could be compatible with disciplines such as hers.   
The lack of any generalising theoretical framework within which her concern 
might find a place is not surprising when we look at what kind of thing is done 
in many university departments under the labels social or cultural 
anthropology.  Take for example the interests listed on the web site of the 
anthropology department of the University of California at Berkeley.  Here are 
some  Genomics and the anthropology of modernity, Science and reason, 
The anthropologies of education, law, tourism, Food and energy, space 
and the body, Post-soviet political discourse, Violence, trauma and their 
political and subjective consequences, Social and cultural history, (Post) 
colonialism, Social mediation of mind.  
I do not intend here to criticize the value of the studies which lie behind these 
titles.  In fact, I know that many are excellent and interesting, but one need not 
be surprised that our psycho linguist got so little response to her request for a 
coherent body of theories. What possible core of shared questions and interest 
could such a varied department have to which her interest might then be related? 
Furthermore, when occasionally, in contemporary anthropology, a proposal of 
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more general import is made, as for example the argument by Nancy Shepper 
Hugues, based on an example  from Brazil, that grinding poverty leads to 
indifference on the part of parents towards the death of their children, the matter 
is criticised anecdotally at the ethnographic level, but at the theoretical level not 
systematically tested and simply left to float in never never land. This incoherent 
fragmentation, in any and every direction, so long as it will find favour with 
funding bodies and seems relevant to the concerns of the moment, makes the 
existence of anthropology departments as working units difficult to justify. This is 
something  which was already complained about by Eric Wolf shortly before his 
death and which led to the near destruction of anthropology at Stanford 
University? 
 
But are we dealing simply with a problem internal to the ways in which 
universities function, simply an accidental result of the way  the discipline  has 
evolved in the academy, yet another illustration of the inevitable arbitrariness 
and shift of  boundaries within science? The frustrated hope on the part of our 
psycholinguist that she could obtain guidance to her questions from professional 
anthropologist might indeed  seem a rather limited problem of communication 
within modern universities, where, after all, it is common for people from one 
discipline to  misunderstand the nature of another department.   
 
I shall argue today that, in fact, there is much more at stake, because the type of 
request made by our psycholinguist for a discipline, such as what anthropology 
might reasonably be assumed to be, is far from an arcane missed appointment,  
internal to the cloistered  world of academia. 
 
Let us  consider a very different situation. 
 
One evening, about six month ago, I was doing  field work  in the little village of 
Ranomena.  This is a place deep in the Malagasy forest,  cut off from all modern 
means of communication and only reachable on foot. I was sitting in near total 
darkness in the tiny house of the family who have been my hosts, on and off, 
during several periods of field study scattered over almost thirty years.  The 
evening meal had been eaten and consequently the fire had burned down.  This 
was, as is usual at this time, a rare moment of relaxation and reflection in which I 
joined freely. The conversation soon turned, as it often did, to questions of a 
philosophical nature though it had begun in a less abstract way.  People had been 
imitating, remembering and making fun of the accents and the vocabularies of 
other ethnic groups in the huge and culturally very varied Island of Madagascar.   
The people of the village, the men at least, are experts in linguistic and cultural 
variation since, when they are young and vigorous, they go as wage labourers to 
many different parts of the country, working for several month at a time  as 
woodcutters or carpenters where they are often employed by merchants 
originating from different parts of  the Indian subcontinents.  After having  been 
reminded of the linguistic variation they had  encountered on their travels, the 
conversation rapidly took on a more theoretical turn.  If people used different 
words, did they understand the phenomena they designated so differently in the 
same way? If we are all related, how had this variation come about? Were the 
speakers of unrelated languages fundamentally different types of moral beings? 
And, if they were, as some maintained, was this due to the language they had 
learnt  or was  the language the manifestation of a deeper cause?  In order to 
grapple with this problem the discussants proposed a thought experiment. What 
about the children of those Malagasy who had emigrated to France and who only 
spoke French? Were they in any sense really Malagasy in their social morality, in 
their ways of thinking and working and in their emotions?   Would  their skin be 
whiter than that of their parents?  And, if not, as everybody seemed finally to 
agree, would their dark skin mean that they would learn Malagasy more easily if 
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they came back to live in Madagascar than, for example,  I had, or  the children 
of Europeans?  Thus, the question of what is learnt and what is innate was 
formulated and reformulated in many, often,  completely abstract general forms. 
The seminar continued.   If there was so much variation and mutability, could one 
say that all humans were one species or several?  Were there discontinuities in 
racial and cultural variation or only continuums?  If we were all one family and, at 
bottom, all thought alike, how could it be possible that  the histories  of different 
groups of mankind had been so dissimilar and had given rise to such differences 
in technological knowledge and wealth? Why were the people from overseas, 
which the people of Ranomena tend to consider all much of a  much ness, 
continually fighting, when they, by contrast, were all so peaceful? And, given the 
fact that there is only one God (it is a Catholic village) how could it have come 
about that there were  people in the world who would do such completely exotic, 
unthinkable things, as burn their corpses, as do the Hindu’s? 
 
These were the questions I recorded in just one evening,  but they and other 
related ones are a familiar feature of intellectual life in Ranomena.  People argue 
among themselves over these matters, whether I am there or not. However, 
because I was there, and that, by now, after many efforts at explanation, the 
villagers of Ranomena had some idea of the kind of subject I taught, they turned 
to me for advice and expertise.  After all, as they often tell me, I had seen and 
read about many more different people in the world than they had, I had studied 
long and hard and had gathered in myself the wisdom of many other 
knowledgeable people who had been my teachers. So, what could I say about 
these crucial questions?  Well I answered as best I could.  But, what strikes me 
most clearly, as I reflect on such pleasant and interesting evenings, is that my 
co-villagers, in spite of a lack of formal education, were coming to the subject of 
anthropology with much the same questions as we might expect from anybody 
who turns to the discipline in a country such as the Netherlands, whether as 
students, or as readers of learned publications, or as members of other disciplines 
in the academy.  Indeed, as you may have noted, the very same question was 
being asked of people who describe themselves as anthropologists  by the psycho 
linguist of my introduction and the Malagasy villagers.   
 
The point I want to stress through these anecdotes is that there is a widespread, 
perhaps universal demand for a subject such as anthropology and that this 
demand exists irrespective of culture, degree of education and intellectual 
tradition. People of all kinds ask questions of the sort of scholars anthropologists 
would seem to be.  One can assume that it  is to get answers to such questions, 
as those that were asked by the villagers of Ranomena,  that  people in the 
Netherlands, or indeed anywhere choose to study the subject, if this  is possible 
for them.   
 
But, had the villagers of Ranomena actually penetrated the portals of the 
academy, would they, then, have had to face the same disappointment as our 
psycho linguist?  The answer is probably yes. And, in order to understand how 
and why this state of affairs has come about  I  attempt here an extremely brief 
overview of the academic history of the subject. One which will inevitably involve 
gross oversimplification and will ignore many counter currents and eddies.  
 
The late nineteenth century was  a  time when a number of highly influential 
anthropological books were published.  These purported, no less, than to give a 
general account of the history of humanity in terms of general evolutionary laws.  
Thus, general characteristics of human beings were seen to be the cause of 
human history which, therefore, had a necessary and unilineal character.  These 
type of books were not new, but, what was new, was the fact that these general 
accounts  were to be supported by  a scientific research enterprise, the aim of 
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which was to collect evidence for the different theories.  This became the 
justification  for the setting up of university chairs and ultimately departments of 
anthropology in many European and American countries.  
 
The discipline was thus to operate a bridge between the history of life up to the 
emergence of Homo sapiens, the subject matter of Zoology, and the history of 
mankind from the time of the invention of writing, by which point historians could 
take over.  Evidence to account for what had happened during this gap was to 
come from the four fields approach, still evident in many anthropology 
departments  in the United States.  The four fields were archaeology, biological 
anthropology, linguistics and what became social and cultural anthropology.   
 
The role of social or cultural anthropology in this schema was to provide evidence 
for the reconstruction of the history of mankind through the study of primitive 
people.  The study of these people was relevant because it was assumed that the 
different groups of mankind had had to advance along a single necessary line of 
progress from one stage to another, where  technological advances  led to linked  
developments in politics, kinship, religion morals and anything else possible. This 
being so, it followed that if one found a living contemporary group of people using 
a certain type of  primitive technology, hunting and gathering, for example, a 
study of their political organisation, their kinship  system, their religion and so on 
would yield information  about the politics, kinship religion and morals of our 
distant ancestors who had used a similar technology.  By this mean anthropology 
could discover the mode of life of those forebears of advanced peoples whose 
prehistory was being gradually revealed by archaeology.   
 
This general method was shared by most anthropological accounts of the time, 
although, of course, the evidence produced in this way was far from clear and 
thus a number of competing accounts of the early history of mankind were 
produced. All these, however, shared an amazing confidence in the ability of the 
subject and its methods to fulfil the vast program which it had outlined for itself.  
These theories are usually described as evolutionist or more precisely as unilineal 
evolutionist theories. 
 
The period about which I have been talking may be referred to as that of the 
founders of the subject. It produced an ordered image of the history of mankind 
and of cultural and social variation.  It is probably because of this that in many 
ways it may be thought of as the heyday of  anthropology’s popular success  and 
consequently we may consider what happened next as its gottedamerung.  But in 
fact, there is not one account to be told about this subsequent history of the 
evolutionists light, but two. The first concerns  the reputation of this moment of 
confidence in the subject among anthropologists and the other is its reputation in 
the wider world beyond. It is the interaction of the two which interests me. 
 
Very shortly after its establishment,  evolutionist anthropology was  destroyed by 
an obvious but fundamental criticism. This criticism took  very different forms but 
it is always ultimately based on the same objection and is  usually called  the 
theory of diffusionism.  The basic point of diffusionism is that human culture does 
not go along a predetermined line, following a limited number of ordered stages, 
because human beings have the ability to learn from each other and can, 
therefore, pass on acquired cultural traits through communication. It is not 
fundamental essential characteristics of human beings which explains history but 
the accidents of with whom they are and have been in contact. Unlike animals to 
whom evolutionary laws apply and who are determined in the long term by their 
biological inheritance, humans are determined by other individuals, in other 
words culture.   
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The implications of the focus on the ability of humans to borrow one from another 
is far reaching.  Since people borrow cultural traits one from another, they can 
individually combine bits and pieces from and ,therefore, there are no naturally 
distinct social or cultural groups. And since these combinations are from 
anywhere,  anybody  and in any order, there are no laws of history.  In other 
words, because humans can, unlike other animals, transmit acquired 
characteristics across and within generations, the history of culture becomes an 
entangled, disordered, extraordinarily complex, mess, quite unlike the ordered 
procession envisaged by the evolutionists. And, since  the past was this tangled 
directionless web so will the  future be; it cannot therefore be predicted.  Again, 
putting the  matter at its most abstract, one can say that what the difusionists 
demonstrated is that the general characteristics of human beings, as such, cannot 
specify the unfolding of human history.   
 
This is a massive blow against the original ambition of a science which was going 
to explain what had happened in human history, in terms of a necessary 
evolutionary sequence and in my view no subsequent theoretical criticism has 
ever had a similar impact. In fact the fundamental nature of the point has meant 
that  it has since simply been repeated, though in many different forms, of which 
the emphasis on the construction of human beings by culture in various post 
modern guises, is only one with  the consequent abandonment of that as a basis 
for theory, the rejection of so called “grand theory” in other words. 
 
It is when we consider this modern variant of diffusionism that we can see at its 
most stark what has happened in the subject.  Anthropology began in a manner 
which assumed that human history could be written like the natural history of 
human beings, as though they were an ordinary kind of animal, whose behaviour 
was governed by the same kind of natural laws as other forms of life.  This was 
then shown to be wrong  by the emphasis on  culture, the product of complex 
communication, the producer of unpredictable historical particularities.  Thus, the 
evolutionary theory was thrown out and people were represented as infinitely 
variable creatures, constructed entirely by the whims of numerable accidents of 
communication.  Animals were constructed by nature, humans by their free 
minds.  This being so anthropology could not anymore have as its  subject matter 
human nature because it had apparently been showed that there was no such a 
thing.  Social and cultural anthropology could then only be, like history, an 
assemblage of anecdotes about this and that, and this is what it became and 
what produced the heterogeneous list of interests of the Berkeley department.   
 
There has, however,  been only one other really significant  tendency which does 
not fit in the dichotomy between an evolutionary theory about human nature and 
a mentalist culturalist one about the hole where human nature used to be.  This 
third theory I shall call functionalism here, although I include under this label 
much more than is usually done. . I  use the term in recognition of a theoretical 
position which is not often given its due partly because it was so clumsily 
theorised,  although I recognise and accept the often repeated criticism that have 
been made against it but which apply to extreme formulations which in fact were 
never very significant.     
 
What I understand by functionalism is, above all an emphasis on seeing culture 
not as a disembodied system of traits, beliefs, symbols, representations, etc…  
but as existing in reality only as a part of the wider ecological process of life. As 
such, there is in functionalism a stress on the unity of processes, not on the 
merely on the wholeness of illusory units called societies and cultures, but on a 
form of epistemological monism uniting  the individual and the environment, the 
mental and the biological and nature and culture.  It is not accidental that such a 
position has developed together with the advocacy of long term field work and it 
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has waned with its decline, since keeping in mind the reality of life processes is 
difficult in theories which are based on narrative accounts and which therefore 
analyse one thing after another.  Such a stance therefore requires a constant 
effort.   
 
This is probably why, as I suggested above, functionalism, in the very general 
sense in which I am using it  here, has  of late been losing ground and why it has 
been replaced by various theories of the diffusionism/ constructivism type.  It is 
also probably because it has been such a European stance that it has been 
drowned by imported theoretical  American debates, endlessly stuck in the 
evolutionist diffusionist controversy. 
 
The contemporary situation seems to be therefore one where evolutionism has 
been dismissed and diffusionism has won leading to the existence of a discipline 
without the only centre it could have: the study of human beings. 
 
This is well  illustrated by the form of most contemporary anthropology teaching.  
At the risk of caricature, it seems to me  that  anthropology courses, whether 
introductory or more specialised, have in common a general structure.   They 
begin with a historical section, where general theories of early anthropologists are 
explained.  These may be from long ago, such as those of  Boas, Durkheim, 
Westermark or Morgan, or, more likely, from the middle distance, Mauss, 
Radcliffe Brown, Malinowski, Van Wouden, or Levi-Strauss.  Then,  what is wrong 
with these theories is demonstrated usually by means of ethnographic examples 
and there the matter rests. The student is, therefore, left not only with a feeling 
of having little to say about the subject in general. He or she has lost a few 
misleading illusions in the process, but also, more insidiously, has got the feeling 
that the very attempt to try to generalise, as the historical figures did, was itself 
wrong.   To be a good anthropologist thus seems to be to have learnt not to ask  
the questions which the Ranomena villagers or our psycholinguist do. 
 
This largely negative stance is not simply due  to the way anthropology has 
developed within the academy, it is also due to the non academic reputation of 
the early evolutionary theories.   
 
In general terms, ideas and publications concerning a unilineal  evolution of 
human societies, seen as  going through a fixed number of stages, antedates 
greatly the academic anthropological evolutionists but, probably in part because 
these were so much in accord with their time, the works of the founders had an 
extraordinary influence in their time, often, somewhat indirectly through the 
mediation of other types of writers such as Freud, Marx and several influential 
literary figures.  The late nineteenth century and early twentieth was, therefore, 
the period when anthropology as an academic subject, although as a very young 
academic subject was enormous on intellectual life in general.  Since then, 
however, if we ignore minor moments which for a short time seem to buckle the 
trend, the general influence of contemporary anthropology has declined.  The 
work of more recent anthropologists, especially those whose work has come out 
since the 1950, with the possible exception of that of Margaret Mead on sex and 
Levi-Strauss on structuralism, has had little influence on the main intellectual 
currents of their time. 
 
On the other hand, the influence of the founders of the discipline has continued 
unabated, distilled in various forms in the general culture in which we bathe.  The 
idea of an evolutionary sequence of societies customs, laws, religions, morals, 
extremely similar to that set out by the evolutionist anthropologists continues, 
even though sometimes a little disguised for the sake of political correctness.  
Thus few people flinch at the implications of remarks such as “It is particularly 
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shocking to witness such brutality in the twentieth century and in an advanced 
country.”   Even more surprising is that that books such as those of Tylor, Morgan 
or Frazer, which in their times sold far far more than any contemporary 
anthropology books are still much read and are actually still in print. The reason 
for the continuing influence of these writers and the relative lack of influence of 
their successors is not difficult to imagine.   It is simply that these early authors 
gave answers, however unacceptable, to the questions asked by the Malagasy 
villagers and our colleagues in other disciplines, while more recent 
anthropologists do not. 
 
The fact that professional anthropologists live in a world where theories they 
consider obsolete still dominate, while their own voices are little heard, has a 
reinforcing effect on the negative theoretical character  of their teaching.  Every 
year university anthropologists are faced with new generations of students who 
have, or are imagined to have, consciously or unconsciously absorbed 
anthropological evolutionist theories. Thus the teaching of anthropology is often 
envisaged by the professionals as an endless fight against erroneous doctrines 
held by the neophytes and which, ironically, were largely encouraged, if not 
created, by the first academic anthropologists. 
 
But there is yet a further element in the educational scene which influences 
anthropology and pushes still further in this same direction. 
 
Apart from the general impression that attempting to formulate general theories 
is a bad and obsolete habit, another message comes through loud and clear in 
the teaching of anthropology.  That is that one of the very bad things which the 
early anthropologists did, was that they placed their own values above those of 
other cultures, and that they therefore saw evolution as necessarily progressing 
towards  peoples and types of societies such as theirs. It followed that  those 
most unlike themselves were rude primitives of the very lowest order.  To do this 
sort of thing is called etnocentricism and is very wicked.  Such a message is 
easily and well received by the kind of students who are likely to choose 
anthropology and who come from a world where the evils of racism and 
intolerance have been all too clear. 
 
However, things are not so simple because when we look more closely we find all 
kinds of elements  treacherously merged under this notion of ethnocentricism.  
The charge that the evolutionist anthropologists were somehow revelling in the 
inferiority of those they chose to call primitives and that this view legitimated 
violence against them is anachronistic and when these writers are seen within the 
context and language of their time, grossly unfair and , ironically, ethnocentric.  
Thus, Tylor, the founder of British anthropology was very active in the anti-
slavery movement and Morgan the founder of American anthropology was closely 
involved in supporting Indian rights.  Indeed this real political involvement 
contrasts with that of many  contemporary anthropologists who willingly 
denounce evolutionism as part of their general campaign for political correctness. 
 
Equally involved in the notion of ethnocentricism is the warning against seeing 
people of other cultures through the lens of our own values.  In fact, two 
elements should  be distinguished here.  The first is a methodological point.  It is 
an injunction to anthropologists that the task of interpretation requires as much 
as possible an effort of imagination.  We must try to see others as though from 
their point of view in order to understand them.  Few would quarrel with the 
benefit of such a stance.   But closely intertwined with this  is the idea that the 
avoidance of ethnocentricism is not just a matter of temporary suspension of 
disbelief but an absolute injunction i.e. that one should never judge or evaluate 
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others by the categories or standards of our culture.  This proposal leads 
therefore inevitably to moral and cognitive relativism. 
 
The ethical  problems of moral relativism are fundamental and have often been 
discussed, notably by  de Martino.  Here I want to concentrate on the theoretical, 
or perhaps the rhetorical, problems involved in cognitive relativism.   
 
Cognitive relativism is often adopted without much theoretical scrutiny since it 
involves a  gut reaction to any attempt at generalisation by showing the 
generalisation  to be nothing but  a mere  product of the  particular cultural 
configuration of the ethnographer situated as he or she inevitably is, at a given 
time in a given place. The demonstration that this is so is a source of  great 
satisfaction to the profession as it demonstrates the superiority of anthropologists 
over lay people. What they think of as the bedrock of their ideas is nothing but 
the shifting sand of a unique historical conjuncture in a unique location.  
 
Now there is no doubt that this kind of criticism of much theory, especially social 
science theory, is one of the major contribution that anthropologists have made 
to scientific enquiry. However, such a position can slip into giving the impression 
that the very attempt to generalise about human beings, however subtly done, is 
always going to be wrong because it will always be nothing but the projection of 
the anthropologists way of thinking.  This  implies the idea that anthropological 
discourse can only be of this sort since any idea about what human beings are is 
in no way constrained by any external reality.  Anthropology as a generalising 
science about human beings becomes a mere illusion of particular cultures or to 
put it another way, the very idea of human beings as a subject of study is shown, 
once again, to be false. 
  
Of course, such an implication is rarely explicit, because, when it is, it runs into 
the well known internal contradictions which absolute relativism inevitably 
creates, i.e. that such a conclusion is also a particularistic cultural mirage.  
Instead, we have something which might almost be called an anthropological 
mood, rather than a theory. However, the damage is done all the same, and the 
damage is that any anchor for a subject such as anthropology has been 
abandoned since cognitive relativism amounts to a declaration that the discipline 
is about nothing.  It is not surprising then that anything goes. 
 
We find ourselves in the present ridiculous situation where when  the question: 
Do human beings exist? is asked most people, although they probably will 
consider it rather silly,  will answer, without hesitation, in the affirmative. 
Anthropologists, on the other hand,  will want very much to answer no but want 
dare so will just go into hiding. 
 
Part of the explanation for this embarrassment is that a straight negation taken 
together with what being a member of an anthropology would seem to mean 
literally, would imply arguing themselves out of a job.  So thinking that through is 
also avoided.  
 
Of course denying the unity of mankind is not new in anthropology but those who 
previously advocated such a position, the so called polygenists of the nineteenth 
century, argued that mankind was made up of four unrelated species and who 
consequently approved of slavery and the hunting of Australian Aborigines as 
though they were wild animals.    These might not be the precursors the present 
day relativists would wish to claim. 
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This surreptitious abandonment of a notion of human nature involved in the 
condemnation of ethnocentrism combines dangerously smoothly with the 
negative stance which the history of the subject has produced and which I 
discussed above.  These two elements reinforce each other in an obscure way.  
This is what produces the situation I described at the outset of this lecture, where 
anthropologists instead of attempting to respond to the kind of request of our 
psycho linguist go into what looks like a silent sulk wrapped in an aura of self 
righteousness.  
 
But of course the questioners, whether they be academic colleagues or Malagasy 
villagers, are less impressed with such a stance than the anthropologists would 
like them to be.  And so they go elsewhere than anthropology departments to 
look for their anthropology.  And there is much that is available, for example in 
the works of  writers whose academic affiliations are very varied but which I label 
here,  for the sake of simplicity, as the generalising writers . Thus we have 
Richard Dawkins, a zoologist, explaining kinship, Rene Girard, a scholar of 
literature, expounding on the origin of religion,  Stephen Pinker, a psycho-
linguist, telling us about totemism and Daniel Dennet, a philosopher, telling us 
about marriage rules.  The success of such works can be seen easily if we look at 
the sales of their books, a success which contrast dramatically with those of my 
colleagues.  They number in hundreds of thousands.  In other words they have 
the same kind of diffusion as the work of Tylor, Frazer or Morgan had and they 
probably have similar influence.  The reason is not difficult to find it is simply that 
these works seem to offer answers to the universal questions of a public hungry 
for anthropology. 
 
We may well ask what is the reaction of professional anthropologists to such 
competitors.  The  answer is none at all.  They consider such theories with so 
much distaste that thy  seem to be unaware of their existence.  Thus, until I 
introduced the topic in a seminar, none of my colleagues at LSE had ever heard 
of Dawkins proposal about the nature of culture  or of the word memes which he 
had coined to express it.  This is at a time when, if you type the word on Google 
you obtain  1,280,000 entries. 
 
The point is that, not only do anthropologists not produce the same kind of works 
as those of Pinker or Dawkins,  it is that they seem to have nothing to say about 
them.  They have withdrawn from the fray to a place where they produce a large 
number of studies, some good, some bad, about this and that without any 
guiding reason or without any idea of building up a coherent body of knowledge.  
It is as though they considered the proposals made in this extra disciplinary 
anthropology as so  beneath them that they are unwilling to acknowledge its very 
existence. 
 
Part of the distaste of anthropologists towards such work is not simply arrogance, 
it is the feeling on their part that they have seen it all before.  Indeed when we 
turn to the books of these writers, we usually find exactly the same problems 
which anthropologists have demonstrated and denounced throughout the 
twentieth century in the work of the founders.  For in the work of these writers 
we come across, for example,  the old easy assumption that contemporaries with 
simple technology are fossils of an earlier age, that human groups form distinct 
empirical entities, that there are obvious and necessary connections between 
technology and such things as ancestor worship etc..  Perhaps the problem is 
simply that social and cultural anthropologists are simply world weary and that 
they say to themselves: we have shown the people the error of their ways and 
nobody listened so why should we waste our energy in doing so yet again, rather, 
like Candide, let us withdraw and cultivate our little garden. But in fact repeating 
the same thing endlessly does not usually worry academics.  The reason  is not 
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only that anthropologists have shown, and could show again, quite rightly,  what 
was wrong with the simplistic answers the founders and their generalising 
successors produced and produce.  It is that, in the process of criticising the 
answers given, they have dismissed the questions and that their problem is that, 
even though they may have done this to their own private satisfaction, everybody 
else is still asking. 
 
Perhaps, you might think, the solution to the present situation may simply be to 
advise people as our psycho-linguist or the Malagasy villagers not to waste their 
time asking their questions of the social and cultural anthropologists and turn to 
the natural science writers.  A kind of solution advocated by writers such as Dan 
Sperber. This, however, would also be  unfortunate, although this is what is 
happening.  First of all, as I have just pointed out the failings of the kind of 
answers such writers are liable to supply have been well thought through by 
professional anthropologists in their discussions of the founders of their discipline 
but which are still as relevant when addressed to modern writers with similar 
theories.  Secondly, these writers can actually give much more limited answers to 
the questions they pose than appears at first sight.  Indeed, the nature of this 
limitation is the source of the recurrence of the unsatisfactory answers which they 
produce. 
 
The reason why the evolutionist writers failed is not that they asked the 
fundamental questions but that having asked them they assumed that the 
answers to these general questions would supply directly explanations about 
particular human situations. The problem with the diffusionist response was that 
by pointing out the inadequacy of the type of answers supplied by the 
evolutionists they discredited any consideration of the questions which remained 
asked by others. 
 
The present situation is that professional anthropologists are difusionists both in 
their fascination with the lack of evident principles governing human society and 
their consequent turning away from general explanation.  While the writers from 
outside the discipline who I have just referred to are evolutionists, sometimes 
explicitly, but in any case epistemologically, and furthermore they are repeating 
the mistakes of their precursors. The problem is that they propose and proposed 
general characteristics about human beings as explanations of the conditions in 
which human beings find themselves at particular times and places.  It is a bit as 
if someone proposed to account for  the pattern of motor traffic in Amsterdam 
with an explanation of how the internal combustion engine functioned.   
 
 
The problem with the evolutionists modern or of the past is their refusal to face 
the reality of the complexity of human history and the infinite variety of human 
configurations caused by the very specific nature of the human animal it 
produces.  The  diffusionist reaction to deny that there is any human nature at al  
by a move to a totally idealist position, this is to see human history as simply not 
rule bound or in other words denying the existence of human beings.  Thereby 
producing the present situation of a discipline without a core producing a 
multitude of unrelated little studies about this and that and one totally unable to 
answer the questions posed of it since it denies their very legitimacy. 
 
The way out of this repeating scenario between the Scylla of evolutionism and the 
Charibdis of diffusionism is therefore not easy.  It must take into listen to the 
questions but explain the difficulties in producing quick answers by instead of 
denying the naturalness of human beings and the environment in which they are 
placed but on the contrary stressing it and stressing how it produces not a denial 
of natural history but a new type of natural history. 
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And here the third type of theory which I mentioned, the stunted half theory 
which I called functionalism comes to our help.  It has no problems with the 
historical particularism which the characteristics of the human animal produces 
since it has as its delights as much as the difusionists in  the infinite and 
unpredictable variety and  complexity of the  different situations   in which human 
beings find themselves.  But unlike the difusionists it does not deny the 
naturalness of human beings, less for theoretical reasons than for practical 
reasons because it is nose to nose with the materiality of others and their 
environment.  It has in front of it solid beings, with mind/brains as part of their 
body, in a solid environment both of which are caught in the rule bound 
unpredictability of the dialectic of life.  Putting it more crudely, when you are 
doing field work, an experience not much different from other forms of living in 
society anywhere to imagine what is happening as predictable and ordered is 
ridiculous and so is the idea hat human existence is a mere web of symbols within 
which we are caught, a maelstrom of traits swirling any which ways, an illusory 
framework of temporary and transient constructions. 
 
Now the problem with the kind of position I am suggesting is that it comes close 
to saying that we should take everything into account, which obviously means 
being unable to say any thing about anything.  This is more or less what such 
writers as Malinowski advised and rapidly leads to an impasse, it seems also what 
lies beyond the kind of theories which have been called practice theory and which 
follow the inspiration of the French sociologist Bourdieu.  Basically they 
recommended a view similar to mine which advocates as our focus seeing people 
things in their environment.  Generalisation is therefore ultimately fussed on the 
nature of human beings but keeping in mind the historical  specificity of the 
situations in which they place themselves. 
 
The problem with what they advocate however is that as a result of the realism of 
this position  it basically asks anthropologists to do everything themselves as 
though this was in any way feasible.  Thus Bourdieu with his theory of habitus 
reinvents psychology a kind of private psychology for the use of social scientists, 
similarly it wants to create a private human geography. The task then becomes 
so immense that it can never get off the drawing board. 
 
But it does not need to be so and the solution can be found in the very episode 
with which I started this lecture.  You will remember  that it concerned a 
psycholinguist who wanted to co-operate with anthropologists. She was not 
simply asking for help she was offering it also. If we want to reintroduce human 
beings in the middle of our study we have to recognise that our research will be 
common with that of other disciplines especially those concerning the capacities 
of the human animal especially its psychological capacity and those which 
concern its interaction with nature. Geography and history.  The research role of 
anthropology will probably be as now to stress the specificity of human beings in 
real situations but doing this in a way which does not close cooperation but rather 
opens them out.  The theoretical task however cannot be an anthropology only 
one it must be one of cooperation.  Just what our psycholinguist was asking for. 
 
 
 
  
But having regained our subject by having returned to the study of human beings 
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But that is only possible with a view of human beings which forgets their 
materiality, their animality and their anchoring in the real world/  something 
which field work restores.  It makes focus on the unpredictable vagaries of history 
in a natural world.  It is possible to recognise human history without losing the 
very idea of human beings.  The contribution of anthropology is this.  But it 
makes us turn to such things the physiology of human beings, the effects of 
technology and the environment and above all the psychological capacities of 
human beings. 
But there is perhaps a solution to be found if we go avoid the almost endless ping 
pong between the camps which were represented by the evolutionists and the 
difusionists which seem to be being replayed today. 
 
 
 
That being so anthropology cannot be alone it needs to turn  to other disciplines 
to further a project which can only be joint.  But here we find that others are 
willing to join in.  Let us remember once again our psycholinguist.  She not only 
was asking for help but also offering it.  
What is necessary however is that we remain evolutionists in seeking answers to 
the questions, that we do not turn away from the questions asked but that by 
engaging in dialogue with real people we consider the complexity  (come off it 
Bloch you are avoiding the problem) of the general in the particular. 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Their lack of understanding of the distributed nature of knowledge. 
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